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 ‘Ordo’ versus ‘Ordnung’: Catholic or Lutheran Roots of German Ordoliberal Economic Theory? 
 
Abstract 
Ordoliberalism is a German tradition of economic and political theory whose influence on the post-
2008 European landscape has been substantial. Ordoliberalism professes a strong state to 
safeguarding competition against monopolies, argues for a strickt anti-inflationary policy and for the 
rigid enforcement of debtor obligations. This reflects the early ordoliberalism’s deep concern with 
the political and economic crises in Germany during the interwar years. The article demonstrates that 
early ordoliberalism was simultaneously deeply concerned with religious issues related to social 
order. Rather than seeing religious and economic engagements as two separate spheres, the article 
shows their deep interrelatedness in early ordoliberal thought. More specifically, the article seeks to 
challenge the established view that the religious inspirations of early ordoliberalism were 
predominantly Catholic, as reflected in the Thomist notion of ordo. By contrast, the article argues 
that ordo was largely an invention of the post-war strategy of the alliance with Catholic social thought 
and that the deeper concern of the early ordoliberals was predominantly with Lutheran Evangelical 
Ordnung.  
 
Keywords:  ordoliberalism, theology, religion, economic theory, discourse, archaeology 
JEL: A12 Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines, A13 Relation of Economics to Social 
Values, B29 History of Economic Thought since 1925: Other  
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1. Introduction 
Ordoliberal economic theory has dominated the post-war German political landscape and by many 
scholars it is considered crucial to the understanding of the North-South rift in the post-2008 political 
landscape of the European Union (Bulmer 2014; Hillebrand 2015; Matthijs and McNamara 2015; 
Nedergaard and Snaith 2015; Young 2014, 2017; for critiques, see Hien and Joerges 2017a; Feld et 
al. 2015). Ordoliberals embrace competitive markets, but they simultaneously profess a strong 
technocratic state to safeguard competition against monopolies and political power (Mudge 2008; 
Bonefeld 2010, 2012; Davies 2014). Other characteristics of ordoliberalism include a strong 
commitment to low inflation, tight antitrust regulation of competitive markets, rigid enforcement of 
debtor responsibilities, and a watertight separation between government borrowing and central bank 
lending. In other words, ordoliberalism has several features distinguishing it within the ‘neoliberal 
thought collective’ to which scholars in general assign it (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). It is not rooted 
in the individualism of classical, Austrian and Anglo-Saxon versions of (neo-)liberalism.  
In this paper, I show that the political and economic theory of early ordoliberalism and the 
diagnosis of the political and economic turmoil in Germany during the interwar years in response to 
which it was first formulated can only be adequately understood by taking into account the deep 
Lutheran Evangelical faith and philosophical and theological engagement of the main protagonists 
like Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alfred Müller-Armack, Constantin von Dietze, Alexander Rüstow 
and Wilhelm Röpke. As Manow (2001) has shown, the founding fathers of early ordoliberalism in 
the 1930s through the 1950s were all devout Lutheran Evangelicals. This Protestant heritage in 
ordoliberalism has played a decisive role in the post-2008 North-South split in Europe (Magatti and 
Martinelli 2016; Hien 2017). Emphatically, the argument advanced here is not that the early 
ordoliberals were driven by religious and theological concerns as opposed to economic theory. By 
contrast, my argument is that according to the early ordoliberals there was no such opposition. 
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Economic, political, philosophical and theological arguments are intertwined by them them as a 
matter of course. Consequently, I argue, their religious and philosophical outlooks fundamentally 
shaped their core economic concepts like ‘competition order’.  While traditional history of economic 
thought generally operates (somewhat anachronistically) from a distinctly modern conception of what 
is economic and what is not economic – relegating, for instance, theology to the non-economic 
elements in the sources that are hence often disregarded – I seek to trace the lines of demarcation 
made in the sources themselves and to analyse the (sometimes very diverse) ways in which ‘the 
economic’ is conceived in them compared to our contemporary conception.   
I am not the first to analyse the role played by religious concerns in early ordoliberalism 
(Goldschmidt 1998; Manow 2001; Jähnichen 2010; Bonefeld 2017a; Hien and Joerges 2017b). The 
originality of the present contribution, therefore, lies in a more specialized question in the existing 
literature. While the traditional history of economic thought has focused narrowly on the ‘economic’ 
(in the modern sense) aspects of early ordoliberalism, in the more narrow scholarship on the 
intellectual roots of ordoliberalism the widespread view is that the main theological heritage in 
ordoliberalism comes not from Protestant, but from Catholic sources. In particular, research has 
emphasised the explicit reference to Thomist scholasticism in the name that ordo-liberalism chose 
for itself. The article shows that while the Thomist tradition is not entirely absent, the main concern 
in early ordoliberalism was rather with Lutheran worldly Ordnung than with Catholic cosmic ordo. 
Both may be translated into English as ‘order’, but they have very different meanings, they designate 
different areas of applicability, reflect different intellectual concerns and generate different problems 
and debates with different historical roots. In brief, the Latin ordo in the Catholic tradition refers to 
Divine order, while the German Ordnung in the Lutheran tradition refers to the ordination of worldly 
authority by God.  
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While Weber analysed the Calvinist trajectory of influence on modern Northern Euroepan and 
Anglo-Saxon economic thinking, the specifically Lutheran heritage is at first a more difficult one to 
grasp, since Luther himself opposed the power of money in all its shapes and forms:  religious 
(indulgence), political (papacy), economic (usury) and private (luxury) (Bruni et al. 2016). But as 
argued in this article, the Lutheran heritage in the case of ordoliberalism does not come with Calvenist 
culture or liberal Protestant social movements, nor does it consist in the adoption of specific economic 
dogmas from Luther’s writings. Rather, ordoliberalism developed from a distinct complex of 
concepts and problems related to the question of social order (Ordnung) rooted in the distinct 
Lutheran Evangelical tradition of ‘political ethics’ in Germanophone countries during the interwar 
years. Thus, from a historical perspective ‘ordo-liberalism’ would be better designated as Ordnungs-
liberalism.  
Section 2 discusses the ‘archaeological’ methodology to the historical study of theories (Libera 
2014). Section 3 presents the dominant view that ordoliberalism is rooted in the scholastic concept of 
ordo and assesses the extent to which this heritage is relevant. Section 4 argues that early 
ordoliberalism is marked by far more profoundly by Lutheran Evangelicalism and the concept of 
Ordnung. The section also traces this concept from the Bible via Luther and Lutheran ‘political ethics’ 
to the founding fathers of ordoliberalism in the 1930s through the 1950s. Section 5 concludes and 
discusses the implications of this shift of focus for our understanding of ordoliberalism as an 
influential modern economic theory.  
 
2. Philosophical Archaeology 
There is a rich scholarship of conceptual history relating in general to the purposes of the present 
article (Richter 1997; Koselleck 2002). At a more specific level, however, I have opted for the 
Foucaultian tradition of ‘archaeology’ as practiced most recently by Alain de Libera (2014, 2016). 
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Building on Foucault (2008), Libera (2014) defines archaeology as the history of migrations, 
translations and alterations of a complex of concepts, problems and theoretical responses – what 
Foucault calls a discourse. Thus, in archaeology it is important not to start out from a once fixed 
definition of the theoretical concept or tradition of interest. In the present case, we should avoid to 
define ordoliberalism from the outset by a number of fixed doctrinal tenets or the concept of order by 
either one or another meaning or heritage. Rather, we should seek to identify and account for a series 
of changing debates, conceptualizations and core problems, and give room for discontinuities, 
contradictions and disagreements (Libera 2016).  
What binds a number of historical enunciations together is not identity in terms of doctrinal 
affiliation or theoretical language, but the engagement with the same ‘problem structure’ (structure 
problématique) (Libera 2014). This relates to Althusser’s (Foucault’s teacher) notion of the 
‘problematic’ of a theoretical practice as the core conceptual concern around which it is organized 
(Althusser 2014). It likewise relates to Hyppolite’s (1974) influential (being a teacher of both 
Foucault and Althusser) reading of Hegel, according to which no concept is identical with itself, but 
is determined in a discrepant and tense relation to other concepts. The ‘problem structure’, then, is 
the core of the mutually determining relationships between concepts, concerns and problems in a 
theoretical discourse – not a doctrinal unity. As a consequence, archaeology does not see conceptual 
contradictions and theoretical conflicts as necessarily dividing different discourses, but as playing out 
on ‘the field of available enunciations’ of a single discourse (Libera 2014).1 
Therefore, when inquiring into Luther’s heritage in modern economic thought from an 
archaeological angle, we should not expect to uncover simple doctrinal identities across theology and 
                                                 
1 While Libera (2016) and Agamben (2009a) both use the term ’philosophical archaeology’, they differ significantly in 
their accounts of it, as Libera relies on a close reading of Foucault’s Archaeology and a familiarity with the contemporary 
French academic discussions in which it is situated and which altered fundamentally the original Kantian conception 
(Hegel read by Hyppolite, Althusser’s concept of problematics), where Agamben produces an ontologized variant of his 
own (ontology being ruled out from Foucaultian archaeology and discourse analysis) with the help of Mauss and 
Heidegger.  
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economics and across the span of four or five centuries. In fact, we may very well discover deep 
disagreements not only between, but also within both Lutheranism and ordoliberalism making such 
an endeavor impossible in the first place. We may even discover theoretical contradictions at the core 
of the writings of a single author. What we may have a chance to find, however, is that such 
disagreements and contradictions – along with the production of affiliated doctrinal positions that 
accompanies them – may be exactly what constitutes the ‘heritage’ from Luther in early 
ordoliberalism, provided that the intermediating alterations can be accounted for. In other words, we 
may find Lutheran concerns, concepts and problems – supposedly of predominantly theological 
character – that have migrated, been translated and altered into related concerns, concepts and 
problems in early ordoliberal economic and political theory, even when such heritage has not been 
conscious or explicit (see Libera 2014).  
 
3. Ordo-liberalism 
It is a widespread view, yet rarely supported by systematic analysis of the sources, that ordoliberalism 
takes its concept of ordo from Thomist scholastic theology. While the founding fathers of early 
ordoliberalism were Lutheran Evangelicals (Manow 2001) and while the notion of order they 
professed in their writings was primarily a specific kind of economic order (market competition) 
supported by the authority of an allegedly depolitizised state (Bonefeld 2012), the historical lineage 
emanating from Thomas Aquinas would suggest a close affiliation with Catholic  social thought along 
with a distinct Western philosophical apparatus for dealing with the question of power. In this section, 
I show that while this thesis bears some relevance in the specific case of the ordoliberal philosophy 
of (economic) science, it is based partly on erroneous presumptions, and that it misses the most central 
characteristics of the ordoliberal concept of order. 
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Recently, there has been some interest in the possible influences of Carl Schmitt’s writings on 
early ordoliberalism (Tribe 2008; Streeck 2015; e.g., Bonefeld 2017b). This literature relies heavily 
on two early mentionings of Schmitt’s work by Eucken and Rüstow who both – in the very same texts 
– reject theories, such as Schmitt’s, of the ‘total state’ (Eucken 1932a; Rüstow 1932). At best, 
Schmitt’s ‘political theology’ bears ideological affinity with early ordoliberalism at a high level of 
generality (Tönnies 2009), as Bonefeld (2012) also admits. More substantially, Schmitt (2016 [1923]) 
is clearly inspired by  Catholic political thought in unequivocally stating that state authority should 
be inherently political – where ‘political’ is to be understood in opposition to the anonymous 
mechanisms of the market. By contrast, the ordoliberals favored a strong but de-politicized state and 
saw the value of the market precisely in its anonymous and mechanistic way of imposing order. As 
early as 1955, Friedrich (1955) observed in the American Political Science Review that ordoliberalism 
had adopted its concept of ordo from Thomist scholasticism. Johnson (1989) – in his biographical 
work on the chief economist of early ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken, and two other prominent 
ordoliberals, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow – notes Eucken’s interest in Max Scheler, a 
phenomenologist and philosopher, and goes so far as to suggest that Scheler’s ‘frequent use of the 
Augustinian concept of ordo may well have been the immediate source of the title of Walter Eucken's 
later journal’. According to Johnson, while for German bureaucrats at the time ‘order’ was something 
that was imposed ‘from above’, i.e., by the state, Eucken and his fellows thought that ‘the order 
appropriate to the market is that which derives from the immanent law of nature, the medieval ordo’ 
(Johnson 1989).2 Johnson admits that it is a weak point that Eucken himself never mentioned this, 
but his wife in her prologue to the first issue of ORDO – the name chosen by the ordoliberals for their 
new journal in 1948 – summoned Grotius who ‘adapted Medieaval natural law to the modern law of 
nations’ (Johnson 1989). Similarly, Ptak (2009, note 8) notes Eucken’s (2004) definition of ordo in 
                                                 
2 This assessment is erroneous. As we shall see, it is precisely the order imposed from above, according to Eucken, that 
allows competition to prosper and endure.  
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Thomist ontological terms as ‘the meaningful junction of variety to a whole’. It is worthwhile noticing 
tha the reference to scholasticism occurs only in the appendix to the post-humously published 
Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik. Moreover, the definition provided by Ptak covers only one of the 
two sides of the definition of order given by Eucken, the other side being positive historical orders 
(see also Goldschmidt 1998).  
Ptak’s observation is taken up by Dean (2013) who uses it to link to Agamben’s (2009b) analysis 
of the concept of ordo in Catholic theology from Augustine to Aquinas as a foundational ontological 
problem for all Western political thought. Saint Augustine (354-430) defines ordo as the adequate – 
hence peace-making, hence good – arrangement of things. He does so in an ontological sense, so that 
even ‘disorder’ and ‘evil’ occur within order. Order is a kind of immanent gold standard in the world, 
according to Augustine, against which disorder and evil are defined (Augustine 1960). For Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), ordo has the same sense of the adequate arrangement of things. According to 
Aquinas, order is manifest and evident in nature and thereby testifies that this world is being directed 
towards (gubernare) a certain end by providence. And so Aquinas defines ‘Good’ as God’s directing 
things towards their destined ends (Aquinas 1975). For human beings (creaturae rationales), the case 
is slightly different from that for the things of nature, because the former has the free will to impose 
its own ends on things by force (violentiam) within this world. But God’s ends lie beyond this world 
and hence beyond the order itself (Aquinas 1975).  
Agamben (2011) seems, correctly, to suggest – albeit without stating it clearly – that the 
theological conceptual machine of ordo has an inbuilt problem of ontology: Across its different 
historical variants, ordo may take the shape of ‘Truth’, ‘God’, ‘Being’ or other universals. The 
fundamental problematic with universals is how to reconcile ordo as (a) the very essence of this world 
when it must simultaneously be (b) outside and beyond the varying historical states of the world (see 
also Althusser 2014; Hindess 1977). But while this critique of ontology is certainly relevant, it will 
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not give us the key to understanding early ordoliberalism and the link between theology and modern 
economic theory as the dominant reading of ordo-liberalism would suggest. Its relevance is limited, 
and it concerns predominantly the philosophy of science of Walter Eucken. 
When Walter Eucken and the jurist Franz Böhm chose the name ORDO for their journal of which 
the first issue was published in 1948, they had the rare fortune to name their own current of thought 
rather than to have a name put upon them by adversaries or posterity. But it is noteworthy that 
ordoliberalism emerged in the interwar years – not after WWII – and that the choice of the name of 
their journal came at a time when this current-without-a-name sought for an alliance with the 
Catholics for political influence (Manow 2010). Their successful attempt had a substantial imprint on 
the policy of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party in post-war West Germany. In other 
words, the reason why ordoliberalism adopted the term ‘ordo’, I argue, was the political strategy of 
alliance with Catholics around the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party that soon gained power 
in Germany. Engagement by the ordoliberals in discussions with Catholics in the post-war years is 
strong. For example, both Rüstow and Müller-Armack contributed to the Catholic volume on Christ 
and the Social Market Economy (Boarman 1955). In his contribution, Rüstow (1955) argues that 
Catholic social thought would have to adapt to the market economy and the kind of indirect 
‘solidarity’ it implies, according to him, and that despite more fundamental confessional 
disagreements they could easily agree on political visions. The very term ‘social market economy’ 
which came to characterize the post-war German economy was coined by Müller-Armack 
immediately following the 1945 peace in his ‘irenic’ efforts to unite Protestantism, Catholicism and 
‘new liberalism’ (Müller-Armack 1968a [1950]; Manow 2010). Indeed, before the end of WWII 
ordoliberalism had no traces of neither ‘ordo’ nor ‘social’. Tribe (2008) has demonstrated that ‘the 
extremely limited attention given by Ordoliberals to the linkage between economic and social policy’ 
before and during WWII. Likewise, there is simply no mentioning of ‘ordo’ in ordoliberal writings 
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before the first issue of the ORDO journal. Here, the translation of Eucken, Böhm and Grossmann-
Doerth’s foreword to the first volume of their new book series Ordnung der Wirtschaft published in 
1937 (Böhm 1937) by Peacock and Willgerodt as ‘The Ordo Manifesto’ has been misleading for the 
English-speaking audience (Böhm et al. 1989).  
It may be objected that Müller-Armack, a sociologist of religion in the tradition of Weber and 
another protagonist of early ordoliberalism, asserts that the choice of ‘ORDO’ was not theoretically 
arbitrary: Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals, according to him, were not capable on their own to lay 
the ‘Christian groundwork’ necessary for the ‘future design of society’ in the same way as ‘the 
Catholic social theory has been for a long time’ (Müller-Armack 1968a). But Müller-Armack 
simultaneously declared Catholic social thought to be outdated and demanded that Catholics bowed 
to the recent achievements of economic science, which had ‘over the last decades conceived the 
principles of free competition as a useful social order [gesellschaftsnützliche Ordnung] in a social 
sense’ (Müller-Armack 1968a). Rüstow, too, in his very outreach to Catholics for political alliance, 
firmly rejected the Catholic notion of solidarity in terms of charity in favour of one rooted in the 
competitive market (Rüstow 1955). So, too, does Eucken reject the insistence on social orders 
(Stände) of modern Catholic social thought as epitomized in the 1931 papal enclitic Quadragesimo 
anno (Eucken 2004). 
As we shall see in section 4, if we give less weight to words (‘ordo’) and more to concerns, 
concepts and problems of a theoretical discourse, we shall largely have to reject the common view 
that ordoliberalism builds on scholastic ground. However, there is one aspect – particularly in Walter 
Eucken’s writings – which does concern a concept of ordo, namely the ordoliberal philosophy of 
science.  
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3.1. Ordoliberal Philosophy of Science 
In two of his main works on economics, Eucken (1934, 1939) exhibits a profound engagement with 
philosophical questions almost entirely neglected by the existing literature on ordoliberalism. He was 
the son of a neo-Kantian philosopher of some renown in his own time, thus familiar with this 
philosophical tradition, and he was the editor and regulary contributer to the journal created in his 
name: Tatwelt: Journal for the Renewal of Spiritural Life (Dathe 2009). In his Grundlagen der 
Nationalökonomie (Eucken 1939), he opens with a discussion of Descartes and devotes the first 
chapters to issues of philosophy of science, establishing his rationalist position in opposition to 
classical empiricism. In Was leistet die Nationalökonomie (Eucken 1934), he quotes not only 
economists like Smith, Pareto and Cassels, but also – and substantially so – philosophers like Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, Lotze, Hume and Comte. To understand his perspective on economic theory 
as presented in his major works, therefore, we need to take into consideration his philosophical views 
and concerns as well. 
Orders, according to Eucken, are the historically specific organization or arrangement of a society 
or a sector of society – such as the economy or a subsector of the economy, e.g., a specific market – 
within which social and economic processes play out (Eucken 1943). But these historical orders are 
not objective truths in themselves, and hence not the true object of social science. However, they do 
reflect objective, universal and absolute ‘order forms’. The order forms make up the finite totality of 
possible forms of orders, not only in the past, but also in the future (Eucken 1943). It is with reference 
to this double definition of historical orders and order forms that Eucken would later refer to the latter 
as ordo (Eucken 2004).  
According to Eucken, order forms cannot be immediately perceived, nor are they simple 
‘averages’ of historical orders. Rather, they constitute a ‘morphological apparatus’, that is, the 
dimensionality of variation in historical forms conceptualized in terms of ideal-typical orders (Eucken 
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1943). The order forms cannot be perceived directly, but the researcher must formulate them as a 
‘logical necessities’ (Denknotwendigkeit) that can, in turn, be used to understand specific historical 
orders (Eucken 1934).3  
Eucken thus distinguishes between truth and reality. ‘Truth’ (Wahrheit) is the ‘Essence’ (Wesen) 
of historical reality, but is not reality (Wirklichkeit) itself. Historical reality is composite and mottled. 
By contrast, Truth is purely intellectual – and yet, it is important to produce theories that ‘contain 
truths that are close to reality [wirklichkeitsnahe]’ (Eucken 1934). And vice versa, for empirical 
science to be ‘objective’ in Eucken’s sense, they must not simply describe historical reality, but 
support the conceptualization of objects in theory(Eucken 1934). The objects of science are not 
empirical things, but the hidden ‘objective Truth’ of the ordo.  
Based on his explicitly rationalist position in the philosophy of science, Eucken believes to have 
overcome nothing less than the ‘great antinomy’ between concrete historical analysis and abstract 
theoretical work that has haunted the search for Truth in the Occident since Plato (Eucken 1934, 
1943). This ‘achievement’ is lauded by his ordoliberal colleague, Konstantin von Dietze, who 
reiterates that ‘the possibility of so doing derives from thinking in “economic orders”’ (Dietze 1947). 
In other words, the concept of ‘orders’ in ordoliberal philosophy of science acts as a mediator between 
objective truth and historical reality. It is an ontological category (a dogma about the Truth of Being) 
that allows an epistemology (a dogma about how to access Truth behind reality) to be developed.  
The presumed achievement, however, runs into problems. Eucken holds that the orders are both 
the very essence of history and the condition of this essence outside history itself. They are 
simultaneously ‘the pure, constitutive, ideal typical fundamental form … that are found in all epochs 
of human history and that can be conquered [by the human intellect] based on the exact observation 
of the different scientific disciplines and through ideal typical [pointierend hervorhebende; as 
                                                 
3 Moreover, Eucken ‘considers it a human obligation (Menschheitsanliegen) to ensure that among the possible social 
orders, the ones inhabited by the nature of ordo are given [political] priority’ (Goldschmidt 1998). 
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opposed to generalizing] abstraction’ and the ‘non-historical theoretical propositions [nicht-
zeitgebundener theoretischer Sätze]’ that are ‘true’ as ‘logical necessities [Denknotwendigkeiten]’ 
although not ‘actual’ in concrete history (Eucken 1943).  This problem is precisely the problem of 
ontology, as identified by Agamben in the case of the ordo of Catholic theology. In Eucken’s case, 
too, ‘order’ must simultaneously be (1) the universal framework or space of possibility outside history 
itself within which particular historical reality plays out and (2) the inner essence of that particular 
historical reality. In other words, there is both an essential and a non-essential part of historical reality 
– the former belongs to the realm of truth, the latter does not. One is perplexed by this consequence: 
Some aspects of reality are not true. Moreover, it is impossible to grasp within the confines of logic 
how the essential part of historical reality can also, at the same time, be universal truth outside 
historical reality (see also Althusser 2014; Hindess 1977). 
Rather than abolishing the inbuilt contradiction of ontology that has shaped Western thought 
since the Middle Ages (Libera 2014), as Eucken himself claims to have achieved, the contradiction 
manifests itself in Eucken’s economic theory as problems of reductionism and indeterminability. At 
the most fundamental level of the ‘order forms’, Eucken distinguishes between degrees of (a) planned 
economy and (b) exchange (market) economy. Within the latter, he distinguishes 25 sub-forms 
depending on the degree to which supply and demand respectively are monopolized or competitive. 
And for each of these forms he distinguishes between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ variants – thus totaling 
precisely 100 ‘objectively given order forms’ of market economy ‘that orccur in the real economy’ 
(Eucken 1943). In other words, objective truth is in fact extremely simple.4  
The only problem is that Eucken’s schema is tautological – either it rains or it does not; either 
the circulation of goods is planned or it is not; either supply and demand are monopolized or they are 
not; either it is open or it is closed. As a formulation of Truth it is therefore arbitrary. Moreover, the 
                                                 
4 The simplicity of the schema is used by Eucken and other early ordoliberals to position ordoliberalism as a ‘third way’ 
between raw capitalism and despotical socialism. 
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argument supporting the specific formulation of Truth in terms of 100 order forms is circular: Since 
‘real’ historical orders never accord with a single order form but are complex mixtures of these, all 
historical realities can be fitted into the schema on an ad hoc basis; and since no concrete historical 
order can be found or conceived of that does not fit the schema in some way, the schema reflects 
objective, universal and absolute truth.  
It is no coincidence if this ressembles Saint Augustine’s paradoxical claim that Evil is part of 
Good because both arguments face the inbuilt problem of ontology. And it would not be surprising if 
ordoliberals had engaged in just as long and vehement a discussion of Eucken’s definition of orders 
as theologians have in the case of the existence and nature of God. But ordoliberals have not done so 
because this is not the core problematic of ordoliberalism. As the remainder of the article will 
demonstrate, the more specific and distinctive religious heritage in the ordoliberal concept of order is 
the Pauline-Lutheran problematic of aligning obedience to worldly authorities and to loving one’s 
neighbour. How can this be done when worldly authorities use force and require you to do the same 
against your neighbour in their name – not only as a police officer, but also simply by keeping 
contracts that may result in bankruptcy of one’s neighbour? 
 
4. Ordnungs-liberalism  
For the early ordoliberals, economic theory and religious and philosophical reflection were not two 
mutually excluding activities. Contrary to the demarcations characterizing mainstream economics 
today, early ordoliberalism is simultaneously economic and theological. Consequently, religious and 
economic concepts are mutually dependent at determining in ordoliberalism and it would be a mistake 
to isolate them from each other. For example, according to Eucken, no order form realizes itself, but 
requires humans to employ their freedom in making it actual in history. Thus, in his view, it was a 
grave mistake of the classical liberals to believe that the best of the order forms – competition order 
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(Wettbewerbsordnung) – had the force to actualise itself and therefore to promote laissez faire policy 
and a confined night-watchman state (Eucken 2004; see also Böhm 1960). The failure of laissez faire, 
however, was not just an economic and political phenomenon. Fundamentally, it was also a religious 
phenomenon. In his ‘Religion – Economy – State’, Eucken argues that the political and economic 
turmoil of the 1930s was the result of a long process beginning with the French Revolution through 
which man had come to be no longer seen as a sinner ‘that only divine mercy can redeem’ (Eucken 
1932b). Through this process, according to Eucken, belief in the state has replaced belief in God, but 
the acts of every individual man could only recover ‘the encompassing interrelation of meaning’ 
through ‘religion, belief in God’ and that ‘[o]nly then will a certain calm enter in the social and 
political field again too’ (Eucken 1932b). The same thesis is also put forward and treated in extensive 
historical and theological detail by Müller-Armack (Müller-Armack 1948) and in the ordoliberal 
‘Bonhoeffer Memorandum’ (Freiburger Kreis 1979) as well as by Brunner (1978) and Gogarten 
(1932). Rüstow likewise asserts that the classical liberal economists’ mistake was based on a ‘false’ 
and ‘pagan deist theology’ – a ‘belief in harmony’, in ‘a harmony pre-stabilised by God’ (Rüstow 
1955, 1960). By contrast, he argues, ‘man has in this world great and difficult assignments [Aufgaben] 
that must be fulfilled’ (Rüstow 1960). To the early ordoliberals, the ‘failure of economic liberalism’ 
was hence above all a problem of the history of religion (Rüstow 1945; Müller-Armack 1948; Eucken 
1932b).  
This is also where the ordoliberals – including Eucken – break explicitly with the Catholic idea 
of ordo as ‘orders of creation’ that are lasting arrangements of this world, unalterable to human beings 
(Dietze 1947). Any state,  according to Catholic thought, has a specific telos: to impose laws in 
accordance with natural law; and so does the economy: ‘the supply of material goods to the people’ 
(Dietze 1947). Dietze contrasts this with the Lutheran-Evangelical tenet that nothing human – 
including any social or economic order – is eternal, but finite, as opposed to the eternity of God. 
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Therefore, no specific economic system can be privileged or treated as sacred, i.e., as belonging or 
emanate from God – only, some economic orders may be more in accordance with Christian ethics 
than others (Dietze 1947). This resonates well with the position of other Germanophone Lutheran 
Evangelical intellectuals at the time who tended to think of orders, not in ordo terms of fixed god-
given social structures, but as Ordnung, as necessary but abstract forms (such as marriage, state and 
church), the specific content of which it was up to historically situated human beings to fill in as their 
political assignment (Aufgabe) according to Christian conscience and the requirements of the 
historically specific situation (Gogarten 1932; Brunner 1978). 
According to the ‘Bonhoeffer Memorandum’ – a 1943 underground writing on social order post 
Nazi collapse authored by Dietze, Eucken, and Böhm, among other Freiburger academics and 
published after the war – it is a fallacy of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition to seek the proscriptions 
for a just human society in the Bible or in the ‘orders of creation’ (historical reality) (Freiburger Kreis 
1979). While the authors of the Memorandum confirm the possibility of ‘a state erected on the basis 
of the principles of Christian morality’, they firmly reject the idea of an ‘“Evangelical” or “Christian” 
state as such, since no earthly order of power and justice ought to claim the right to bring about the 
Kingdom of God on earth (Freiburger Kreis 1979). Even the Law of Moses is ‘no code containing 
norms of justice, but an instruction for conscience’ to act towards one’s neighbour in love of God and 
in view of the final judgement (Freiburger Kreis 1979, my italics; see also Calvin 1911).  
Under the influence of Barth (2010 [1919/1922]), Germanophone Lutheran Evangelicalism was 
heavily concerned with Saint Paul’s discussion of the correct Christian attitude towards wordly 
authorities in the Epistle to the Romans, which is also a central topic of discussion in Luther’s work 
(Luther 1931, 1960, 1964, 1966). According to St. Paul, to love one’s neighbour, to not resist the 
evildoer, and to not claim to be just or to know justice – these essential Christian commandments 
entail that Christians must also obey worldly authority (Rom. 13,2). Worldly authorities ‘have been 
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instituted by God’ (Rom. 13,1). This claim is repeated by Luther (1966 [1523]) in his work On 
Worldly Authority. It is against this backdrop the ordoliberal Memorandum states that: ‘for us, 
everything hinges on further developing the Lutheran doctrine of Christian authority on the basis of 
the infinitly rich historical-political experience that we have acquired in the meantime’ (Freiburger 
Kreis 1979, my italics).  
As opponents to the Nazi regime, the authors of the Memorandum sought a way to uphold the 
Pauline-Lutheran injunction to obey worldly authority without depriving themselves as human beings 
of their ethical and political obligation to struggle against evil in the world. In this, they situated 
themselves in an ongoing debate within Germanophone Lutheran Evangelical theology following 
Barth (2010) – in particular the ‘political ethics’ of Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten and Paul 
Althaus (Röpke 1944; Müller-Armack 1968b; Freiburger Kreis 1979; all of which are occasionally 
mentioned in early ordoliberal writings e.g., Eucken 2004).  
The Lutheran Evangelical concept of Ordnung concerns a problem of mediating between the 
apparently contradictory Pauline requirements for Christian conscience: (a) to love unselfishly one’s 
neighbour in faith of God; (b) to obey and serve worldly authority, however despotical. This problem 
became very pressing for the early ordoliberals, not only due to the experience of the Nazi regime, 
but also to what they thought of as the two-front war against despotical socialist central planning and 
the decomposition of society under both laissez-faire capitalism and interest-group-based 
parliamentarism (see Eucken 1932b; and his intervention at the “Liberalism and Christianity” session 
at the Mont Pelerin Society 1947). How could the Christian at one and the same time (a) unselfishly 
serve his neighbour; (b) disinterestedly serve the state; (c) actively fulfil his assignment of political 
engagement against human sin and evil in society? To the early ordoliberals, the concept of Ordnung 
was the response to this problem. More specifically, competition order (Wettbewerbsordnung) of a 
free and fair market framed by a strong, but depolitizised technocratic state apparatus to check the 
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accumulation of power at the hands of single enterprises or political interest groups was the 
‘scientific’ (based especially on Eucken’s work on economics) ideal order towards which human kind 
should strife.  
 
4.1. Love your Neighbour and Competition Order 
According to the early ordoliberals, the Christian should resist all political forms that would not check 
the excessive accumulation of economic and political power or would elevate human beings to the 
level of the divine – the ordoliberals thereby distanced themselves from both humanism, classical 
liberalism, human rights, socialist utopias and Nazi idolatry of Führer and Volk (Müller-Armack 
1948; Freiburger Kreis 1979).5 The Christian should struggle for a strong but de-politizised state 
apparatus which does not serve the interests of the specific group in power, but instead counters the 
formation of political and economic power groups. This is best done, according to the ordoliberals, 
by exposing everyone to the same degree of ordered competition – not to the brutal Law of the Jungle 
of laissez-faire, but to ‘fair competition’ (Rüstow 1932, 1955; Böhm 1989 [1966]; Böhm et al. 1989 
[1936]).  
Rüstow argues that Christian solidarity and loving one’s neighbour is not about one individual 
showing charity to another individual, as the Catholics hold, but is a political task of creating an 
Ordnung in which individuals are not subjected to the power and intentions of others, but only to the 
anonymous forces of fair competition (Rüstow 1955). ‘The competition order forces even the pure 
egoists to act in the common interest’ and is ‘the only order that bends the powers of egoism’ while 
remaining anonymous and disinsterested (Eucken 2004). The price mechanism is what makes this 
                                                 
5 This position distances them from the ‘German Christians’ – the dominant fraction within the German Evangelical 
Church which embraced Nazi rule. Nazi ideologists too, not least of Carl Schmitt, employed the word Ordnung and there 
was some interaction between these two traditions. Some order theologians (Althaus, Gogarten) and even ordoliberals 
(Müller-Armack) supported the Nazi rule for shorter or longer periods of time and with varying enthusiasm. But in 
general, the ordoliberal current early on opted for political liberalism and a rejection of Führer idolatry (Johnson 1989; 
Dathe 2009).  
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happen. Thus, in the ordoliberal competition order, man is enabled to fulfil his Christian ‘duty’ to 
provide for himself and his intimates. The system does not have to rely on alms, but allows every 
individual to fulfil his moral obligation to work (Rüstow 1955; Freiburger Kreis 1979; Eucken 2004). 
This builds directly on the theological tradition of Lutheran Evangelicalism. Both Paul and 
Luther emphasised that man is evil in all his desires, interests and acts. Only by eliminating these can 
the Christian be just. Not by any ‘good deeds’, but only by faith alone can the Christian love his 
neighbour and fulfil his duty (Rom. 3,10-20). As Luther repeats incessantly in his Cathecism, all that 
sinful human beings can and must do is to love, trust, and fear God. Love and faith – the essence of 
Christianity – is strictly spiritual.  
In a slight but important modification of the Lutheran interpretation of St. Paul, Barth stated that 
the reason for obeying worldly authorities is purely negative: Since man does not and cannot know 
justice, he has no ground on which base a revolt against the established rule (Barth 2010). The 
injunction is not a defence of worldly authority, according to Barth, but an attack on man’s ‘intention 
towards the hights’, his idolatry (Barth 2010). But to the followers of Barth, Ordnung became the 
solid ground for Christian ethics because it consisted not in positive demands and proscriptions for 
individuals, but was an anonymous, divine social form that allows Christians to serve their neighbour 
through the obedience to worldly authorities as a religious assignment (Aufgabe) (Althaus 1923; 
Gogarten 1932; Brunner 1978). In their view, this had precisely the advantage to impose order in 
society without attempting the impossible: to elevate certain human beings and their human sense of 
justice above sin (e.g., above corruption and power abuse). This tradition of Lutheran Evangelical 
thinking took the name ‘political ethics’. 
The modern liberal state had failed, according to Gogarten, because it is based on a human 
conception of equality, while the true Polis rules over its citizens as dependent and obedient 
(Gogarten 1932). Polis erects barriers to the unfolding of human evil (desires and interests) by the 
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historically given authority in which ‘one man is placed above another, not as individual, but as the 
bearer of a duty’ (Gogarten 1932). Based on authority, the Polis protects the other orders – most 
importantly those of family, economy, state, justice, and customs (Gogarten 1932). And Polis 
provides freedom – not in terms of absolute individual rights, but in mutual dependence towards 
others: ‘freedom of responsibility’ (Gogarten 1932). Political freedom only emerges through the 
orders (Gogarten 1932).  
Brunner adds that serving the historical orders is ‘always a service rendered to one’s neighbour’, 
and that ‘fitting into the given historical order is the first word of Christian ethics’ because it reflects 
the divine order forms (to use Eucken’s expression) of family, state, economy, justice, customs, and 
so on (Brunner 1978). Hence, ‘loving one’s neighbour’ is not the romantic or heroic ‘good deed’ done 
for a specific individual, but serving one’s ‘official duty’ in the orders: 
 
The ‘official duty’ is ‘coarse’, factual-technical, and the relationship to other people required 
by it is an outward one, a process of mastering the masses. Indeed, it can seem in utter 
contradiction to love. Its implementation necessitates force, perhaps physical force, and even 
killing. … The Christian sees in these orders God’s disciplining [Zucht] of us sinfull human 
beings, but also – at  the same time – sees sin itself (Brunner 1978). 
 
Here, Brunner follows Luthers Pauline argument that ‘God’s will is that the worldly sword and justice 
must be enforced for the punishment of the evildoers [Bösen] and for the protection of the pious’ 
(Luther 1966). To use the sword – even to kill – is completely in accordance with ‘loving one’s 
neighbour’, if only it be done in the name of, and as a service to, worldly authority, and not out of 
selfish motives (the same point is made by Calvin 1911, likewise with reference to St. Paul). 
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The concept, concern and problem of Ordnung that organized early ordoliberalism as an 
offspring of Lutheran Evangelical political ethics is thus very different from the ontological one of 
ordo in the Catholic tradition. It concerns not the Kingdom of God on earth, not individual charity 
and not the formation of a humane society. Rather, it concerns the political promotion of a social 
order exercising its powers anonymously, so as to avoid putting it into the hands of interested 
individuals (sinful human beings) and hence allowing the Christian to serve the wordly authorities as 
his divine assignment in good faith.  
This concern has deep historical conceptual roots. In Romans, it is stated that: ‘whoever resists 
authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment’ (Rom. 13,2). St. 
Paul uses the Greek diatage (δίαταγῇ) where the English version has ‘what God has appointed’. 
Diatage can also be translated with ‘order’, if one bears in mind its conotations of ‘ordination’, 
‘commandment’, or ‘regulation’. Saint Jerome’s Vulgate has ‘Dei ordinationi’ – meaning God’s 
‘ordination’, ‘regulation’ or ‘arrangement’ – not ordo. And Luther’s (2003 [1522]) German 
translation of the Bible has ‘Gottis ordnung’. The conceptual history of Ordnung in German 
Protestant theology is thus different from that of ordo in the scholastic sense. Scholastic ordo has its 
roots in another Greek word – the Aristotelian taxis (τάξις), which also counts ‘order’ among its 
meanings, but with connotations of ‘system’, ‘rank’, ‘class’, ‘composition’ or ‘sequence’ (just like 
the Latin ordo) (Ritter and Gründer 1984). Ordoliberalism emerged from the mainly Protestant 
history of Ordnung – or diatage, ordination – rather than the Catholich one of ordo.  
Within the Lutheran Evangelical tradition, intentionality is put centre-stage of the Protestant 
attempt to align loving one’s neighbour and social order. One may kill if one does so in ‘executing 
God’s law’ – including that of the given worldly authority since it is appointed by God. But one may 
not do so if one does it in the name of some human sense of justice or group interest – as the peasentry 
did on Luther’s time when revolting against political and economic oppression from their lords 
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(Luther 1964 [1525]). It is only through this tradition that the early ordoliberal conception of a strong 
but anonymous state promoting fair competition can be adequately comprehended. The selfish and 
egoistic drives are what make humans sinful, according to Luther. According to the ordoliberals,  
‘competition order’,  is ‘the only order that bends the powers of egoism’ (Eucken 2004).  
Interestingly, the ordoliberal view seems to permeate the European Union today – not only in the 
political struggles during the Eurocrisis, but also at the level of legal structures of the Internal Market. 
As Massimiliano Vatiero has shown, rulings by the European Court of Justice has promoted dominant 
firms to act ‘as if’ they did not possess monopoly power (Vatiero 2015). In other words, the problem 
of market power in the EU does not seem to be conceived so much in terms of power as such, but 
rather of the intentional exercise of power in one’s own interest.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In early ordoliberalism, the Lutheran Evangelical problem of synthesizing obedience to worldly 
authorities with loving one’s neighbour translates into a problem of the political power which is 
necessary to impose and maintain order. This problem is not only about the risk of abuse of power, 
but also about how to use force legitimately without violating the injunction to love one’s neighbour. 
The concept of order surfaces in ordoliberalism as a solution to this central theoretical problem – not 
as ordo, but as Ordnung in the Germanophone tradition of Lutheran Evangelical political ethics. 
Ordnung is not about the aporia of relating individual and society or reality and truth. Rather, it is 
determined by distinctly Lutheran conceptions of freedom, worldly authority, and loving one’s 
neighbour. Analysing Ordnung within this conceptual compound has revealed the specific motivation 
in early ordoliberalism for simultaneously promoting competititive markets and a strong state. 
Specifically, ‘competition order’ – a free market combined with a strong de-politizised state – is 
the ordoliberal response to how power can be exercised so as to curb human egoism without itself 
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falling prey to that sinful desire. Competition order is not about producing socially optimal outcomes 
based on fundamental individual rights, but about taming sin as a purely spiritual phenomenon 
(desire, egoism) and providing viable conditions for loving one’s neighbour. By contrast, the free 
market under laissez-faire capitalism, according to the ordoliberals, is a hotbed for sinful and atheist 
egoism. To ordoliberals, the strong state is neither there to protect the ‘free’ market, nor to ‘regulate’ 
it, but to produce and underpin ‘competition order’. Competition order may provide individuals with 
freedom, but not in the sense of absolute rights. Rather, ordoliberal freedom consists in the 
preservation from social chaos and from power being hijacked by human interests or by a human 
sense of justice (sin). Hence, there is no absolute reason why, for example, that state should be a 
democracy (see also Manow 2010). In ordoliberalism, freedom is not a humanist absolute, but a 
spiritual given; the state is neither good (only God is) nor evil (only individual human beings are), 
but it may serve the good precisely in so far as it remains neutral and curbs human egoism. By 
contrast, when hijacked by individuals, private enterprises or group interests, the state apparatus has 
by definition fallen into the hands of Evil. What the ordoliberal market economy produces in the end 
is not a socially optimal state, but the necessary conditions for individuals to engage in relations of 
mutual dependence and obedience with one another.  
At this point, I would like brieftly to reiterate a methodological point made in section 2, which 
can now be illustrated with examples from the analysis in sections 3 and 4. The argument here is not 
that there is a simple doctrinal unity – let alone ideological or theoretical coherence – running from 
St. Paul over Luther and political ethics to early ordoliberalism. We have already seen a number of 
discrepancies, disagreements and contradictions withing the discourse: (a) while Ordnung dominates, 
there are also elements of ordo in ordoliberalism, yet we also find firm rejections of the ordo tradition; 
(b) the irresolvable contradiction of ontology at the core of the ordoliberal philosophy of science; (c) 
Barth (1934) rejected political ethics and the early ordoliberals were critical of it (Eucken 1932b; 
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Freiburger Kreis 1979; Eucken 2004); (d) the ordoliberals disagreed vehemently among themselves 
on certain issues (see, for instance, Rüstows letters to Eucken and Röpke, Rüstow 1946a, b). What 
we have seen is rather a number of concerns, concepts and problems that are closely intertwined in 
their deployment across Lutheran Evangelical and early ordoliberal discourse, which also helps to 
trace and to understand the emergence of new concepts such as ‘competition order’ as responses to 
the same ‘problem structure’ within that discourse.  
It would be inappropriate, albeit tempting, to extrapolate grand conclusions about ordoliberalism 
in Germany and the EU today from the analysis presented in this paper. It will require a full-blown 
research project to decide whether Ordnung has maintained its centrality and determinations in 
ordoliberal discourse between 1945 and 2018. We have seen that discursive stability across wide 
spans of history is indeed possible, but also that the specific theoretical formulations determined by 
the discourse may alternate and change continuously. It would be surprising indeed if the postwar 
history – of political compromises with the Catholics in the CDU party, of popularization of 
ordoliberalist thought and consequently of recruitment from outside Lutheran-Evangelical circles, of 
German reunification and of European integration and existential crisis – had not entailed some 
changes to the ordoliberal theoretical apparatus. The question, then, becomes whether the problem 
structure and the centrality of Ordnung, too, have changed or remained stable. Some indications may 
be quoted supporting the stability thesis, notably Hien’s (2017) work, but also detailed conceptual 
analyses of the ordoliberal legal structures of the EU, such as Vatiero (2015). Moreover, the main 
policy goals of ordoliberalism have remained stable throughout the period: state-guaranteed 
competition order, hard-line anti-inflationist monetary policy, and uncompromising enforcement of 
debtor obligations. These are only indications; the research necessary to answer the question 
appropriately remains to be conducted. The present paper has provided the foundation necessary for 
us even to formulate the question in the first place.   
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